Abstract. We present efficient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) under the Symmetric External DiffieHellman (SXDH) assumption in bilinear groups. In our IBE scheme, all parameters have constant numbers of group elements, and are shorter than those of previous constructions based on Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumption. Our construction uses both dual system encryption (Waters, Crypto '09) and dual pairing vector spaces (Okamoto and Takashima, Pairing '08, Asiacrypt '09). Specifically, we show how to adapt the recent DLIN-based instantiation of Lewko (Eurocrypt '12) to the SXDH assumption. To our knowledge, this is the first work to instantiate either dual system encryption or dual pairing vector spaces under the SXDH assumption. Furthermore, our work could be extended to many other Functional Encryption. Particularly, we show how to instantiate our framework to Inner Product Encryption (IPE) and Key-Policy Functional Encryption (KP-FE). All parameters of our constructions are shorter than those of DLIN-based constructions.
Introduction
Identity-Based Encryption. The idea of using a user's identity as her public encryption key, and thus eliminating the need for a public key certificate, was conceived by Shamir [34] . Such a primitive is known as Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), which has been extensively studied particularly over the last decade. We now have constructions of IBE schemes from a large class of assumptions, namely pairings, quadratic residuosity and lattices, starting with the early constructions in the random oracle model [9, 17, 23] , to more recent constructions in the standard model [15, 7, 8, 16 , 1].
Short IBE. It is desirable that an IBE scheme be as efficient as possible, if it were to have any impact on practical applications. Ideally, we would like to have constant-size public parameters, secret keys, and ciphertexts. Moreover, the scheme should ideally achieve full security, namely to be resilient even against an adversary that adaptively selects an identity to attack based on previous secret keys. The first fully secure efficient IBE with constant-size public parameters and ciphertexts under standard assumptions was obtained by Waters [37] in 2009; this scheme relied on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) and Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumptions. Since then, Lewko and Waters [27] and Lewko [26] gave additional fully secure efficient IBE schemes that achieve incomparable guarantees. Prior to these works, all known IBEs (in the standard model) were either selectively secure [15, 7, 16 , 1], or require long parameters [8, 36, 16 , 1], or were based on less standard assumptions that depended on the query complexity of the adversary [22] . From a practical stand-point, Waters' fully secure IBE [37] is still not very efficient as it has relatively large ciphertexts and secret keys, i.e., eleven and nine group elements, 1 respectively. Lewko's scheme [26] improved on both of these parameters at the cost of larger public parameters and master key.
Shorter IBE? In his work, Waters also suggested obtaining even more efficient IBE schemes by turning to asymmetric bilinear groups:
Using the SXDH assumption we might hope to shave off three group elements from both ciphertexts and private keys.
In fact, improving the efficiency of a scheme using asymmetric pairings was first observed by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [10] . At a fixed security level, group elements in the asymmetric setting are smaller and pairings can be computed more efficiently [20] . (Estimated bit sizes of group elements for bilinear group generators are given in next paragraph.) Informally, the SXDH assumption states that there are prime-order groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) that admits a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T such that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in both G 1 and G 2 . The SXDH assumption was formally defined by Ballard et al. [3] in their construction of a searchable encryption scheme, and has since been used in a number of different contexts, including secret-handshake schemes [2] , anonymous IBE [18] , continual leakage-resilience [13] , and most notably, Groth-Sahai proofs [24] . Evidence for the validity of this assumption were presented in the works of Verheul [35] and Galbraith and Rotger [21] .
Symmetric vs Asymmetric Pairings. The ordinary elliptic curves that give the best performance while providing discrete log security comparable to three commonly proposed levels of AES security are given in Table 1 . [4] , descriptions of the elliptic curves are in [19] : 80-bit security, a 170-bit MNT curve [29] with embedding degree k = 6; 128-bit security, a 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curve [5] with k = 12; 256-bit security, a 640-bit Brezing-Weng curve [14] with k = 24.
Note that we assume that curves that support sextic twists are used for k = 12 and k = 24 as this allows elements of G 2 to be 1/6 the size of elements of G T . We also assume that point compression is used to represent a group element. We further note that a symmetric pairing only exists on supersingular elliptic curves. The restriction to supersingular elliptic curves means that at high security levels the group G 1 will be much larger than the group G 1 on an equivalent ordinary curve.
Our Contributions
In this work, we present a more efficient IBE scheme under the SXDH assumption; our scheme also achieves anonymity. 2 The ciphertexts and secret keys consist of only five and four group elements, respectively. That is, we shave off two group elements from both ciphertexts and private keys in Lewko's DLIN-based IBE [26] . Table 2 gives a summary of comparisons between existing and our IBE schemes. Table 2 . Comparison between existing and our IBE schemes, where λ is the security parameter (and it depends on the curve we use). Here, |PP|, |SK|, |CT|, # pairing stand for public parameters size, secret key size, ciphertext size, the number of pairing for decryption, respectively; |Gx| represents bit length of group Gx, where x ∈ {0, 1, 2, T }, and G0 refers to a group in the symmetric pairing setting.
Our approach. As with all known fully secure efficient IBEs, our construction relies on Waters' dual system encryption framework [37] . Following Lewko's DLIN-based IBE [26] , we instantiate dual system encryption under the SXDH assumption via dual pairing vector spaces [30, 31] , which is a technique to achieve orthogonality in prime-order groups. This is the first work to instantiate either dual system encryption or dual pairing vector spaces under the SXDH assumption. We proceed to highlight several salient features of our IBE scheme in relation to Lewko's IBE [26] :
-Our scheme has an extremely simple structure, similar to the selectively secure IBE of Boneh and Boyen [7] , as well as the fully secure analogues given by Lewko and Waters [27] and Lewko [26] . -By shifting from the DLIN assumption to the simpler SXDH assumption, we obtain an IBE scheme that is syntactically simpler and achieves shorter parameters. Specifically, Lewko's IBE scheme [26] relies on 6 basis vectors to simulate the subgroup structure in the Lewko-Waters IBE scheme [27] , whereas our construction uses only 4 basis vectors. This means that we can use a 4-dimensional vector space instead of a 6-dimensional one. As a result, we save two group elements in both the secret key and the ciphertext, that is, by a factor of 1/3. The savings for the public parameters and master key is even more substantial, because we use only two basis vectors for the main scheme, as opposed to four basis vectors in Lewko's scheme. In both our scheme and in Lewko's, the remaining two basis vectors are used for the semi-functional components in the proof of security. -The final step of the proof of security (after switching to semi-functional secret keys and ciphertexts) is different from that of Lewko's. We rely on an information theoretic argument similar to that in [32] instead of computational arguments.
Finally, we believe that our SXDH instantiation constitutes a simpler demonstration of the power of dual pairing vector spaces. We also show how to instantiate our framework to Inner Product Encryption (IPE) [25] and Key-Policy Functional Encryption (KP-FE) [32] . All parameters of our constructions are shorter than those of DLIN-based constructions [32] . Table 3 gives a summary of comparisons between the IPE/KP-FE schemes of [32] and ours. Table 3 . Comparison between the IPE/KP-FE schemes of [32] and ours. All measurements are rough estimations (after removing small terms). Here, n refers to the dimension parameter in IPE setting or the parameter for the maximal dimension of attribute vector in KP-FE setting; d denotes size of the attribute set; andâ is the number of rows in the matrix of the access structure.
Independent work of Ramanna et al.
An independent work of Ramanna, Chatterjee and Sarkar [33] also demonstrated how to obtain more efficient fully secure IBE via asymmetric pairings. Similar to our work, their constructions rely on dual system encryption; however, they do not make use of dual pairing vector spaces. Our constructions achieve shorter ciphertexts and secret keys than their work, while relying on a single assumption (whereas their construction relies on a triplet of assumptions). Moreover, our scheme achieves anonymity; theirs does not. Finally, they obtain their schemes via careful optimizations, whereas our scheme is derived via a more general framework.
Preliminaries
In what follows, we borrow the definition and the game-based security model for Functional Encryption (FE) from [12] which are adequate to define all encryption systems in this paper.
Functional Encryption
As in [12] , we first describe a functionalityF of the syntactic definition of FE. The functionalityF describes the functions of a plaintext that can be learned from the ciphertext: 
then we require that y =F (v, x) with probability 1.
The empty key ϱ:
The special key ϱ in K captures all the information about the plaintext that intentionally leaks from the ciphertext. The secret key for ϱ is empty and also denoted by ϱ. Thus, anyone can run Dec(PP, ϱ, CT) on a ciphertext CT ← Enc(PP, x) and obtain all the information about x that intentionally leaks from CT. Take IBE for example,F (ϱ, (id, m)) outputs only |m| (the length of message m) in the attribute-hiding setting while it outputs |m| and the identity id in the payload-hiding setting. Henceforth, we assume that every FE scheme contains the empty key ϱ in the key space K and we will not explicitly mention it.
We now define the security model for FE. For the plaintext pair (x 0 , x 1 ) of an adversary's choice, we need the following requirement to make the experiment non-trivial:
1 ) for all v for which the adversary has SK v .
Then we define a security game for an FE scheme as follows: -Challenge: A submits two plaintexts x 0 , x 1 ∈ X satisfying requirement (1) and in return, it receives Enc(PP, x β ).
-Guess: A continues to issue key queries as before subject to requirement (1) and eventually outputs a bit in {0, 1}.
For β = 0, 1 let W β be the event that the adversary outputs 1 in Experiment β and define
Definition 4. An FE scheme is fully secure if for all PPT adversaries A the function Adv
In all encryption systems of this paper, a plaintext x ∈ X is itself a pair (ind, m) ∈ I × M where ind is called an index and m is called the payload message. Let x 0 = (ind 0 , m 0 ), x 1 = (ind 1 , m 1 ) ∈ X be the adversary's choice of plaintext pair, we then consider the following variations:
-If the adversary's choice subjects to the restriction that ind 0 = ind 1 , the security game is then under the payload-hiding model;
-If the adversary's queries subject to the restriction thatF (v i , (ind 0 , m 0 )) ̸ = m 0 and F (v i , (ind 1 , m 1 )) ̸ = m 1 for all the key queries v i , the security game is then under the weakly attribute-hiding (or anonymous) model.
Identity-Based Encryption
In the IBE setting, a functionalityF is defined over a key space and an index space using sets of identities. The key space K and index space I for IBE then corresponds to all identities id. Herê
Inner Product Encryption
In the IPE setting, a functionalityF is defined over a key space and an index space using sets of vectors. The key space K (resp. index space I) for IPE then corresponds to all non-zero vectors v (resp. x)). HereF 
Key-Policy Functional Encryption
We first describe the concept of span programs typically required by ABE. We first give the notion of a non-monotone access structure with evaluating map γ by using inner-products of attribute vectors. 
Let Γ be a set of attributes, i.e.,
When Γ is given the access structure A, mapγ :
We use the following secret-sharing scheme for a non-monotone access structure or span program. In a KP-FE scheme supporting non-monotone access structure, a functionalityF is defined over a key space and an index space using sets of non-monotone access structures and attribute vector tuples, respectively (see Definition 6) . The key space K corresponds to all non-monotone access structures A := (Â,ρ), while the index space I corresponds to all attribute sets Γ . Here,
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
Our constructions are based on dual pairing vector spaces proposed by Okamoto and Takashima [30, 31] . In this paper, we concentrate on the asymmetric version [32] . We only briefly describe how to generate random dual orthonormal bases. See [30, 31, 32] for a full definition of dual pairing vector spaces.
Definition 8 (Asymmetric bilinear pairing groups). Asymmetric bilinear pairing groups
, and a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e :
In addition to referring to individual elements of G 1 or G 2 , we will also consider "vectors" of group elements. For v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ Z n q and g β ∈ G β , we write g v β to denote a n-tuple of elements of G β for β = 1, 2: g
. For any a ∈ Z q and v, w ∈ Z n q , we have:
Then we define
Here, the dot product is taken modulo q.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we will choose two random bases
, subject to the constraint that they are "dual orthonormal", meaning that
where ψ is a random element of Z q . We denote such algorithm as Dual(Z n q ). Then for generators g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , we have
whenever j ̸ = k, where 1 here denotes the identity element in G T .
More generally, we can sample multiple tuple of "dual orthonormal" bases. Namely, for fixed (constant) dimension n 1 , . . . , n d , we will choose d tuples of two random bases
q , subject to the constraint that they are "dual orthonormal", meaning that
for all j and i, where ψ is a random element of Z q . We denote such algorithm as Dual(Z n 1 q , . . . , Z n d q ).
SXDH Assumptions
Definition 9 (DDH1: Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in G 1 ). Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
The dual of above assumption is Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 2 (denoted as DDH2), which is identical to Definitions 9 with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. We say that:
Definition 10. The Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if DDH problems are intractable in both G
1 and G 2 .
Statistical Indistinguishability Lemma
We require the following lemma for our security proofs, which is derived from [32] .
(A is invertible with overwhelming probability),
Subspace Assumptions via SXDH
In this section, we present Subspace assumptions derived from the SXDH assumption. We will rely on these assumptions later to instantiate our encryption schemes. These are analogues of the DLIN-based Subspace assumptions given in [26, 32] .
Decisional Subspace Assumption Definition 11 (DS1: Decisional Subspace Assumption in G 1 ). Given a group generator G(·), define the following distribution:
where K, N are fixed positive integers that satisfy 2K ≤ N . We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
Lemma 2. If the DDH assumption in G 1 holds, then the Subspace assumption in G 1 stated in Definition 11 also holds. More precisely, for any adversary A against the Subspace assumption in G 1 , there exist probabilistic algorithms B whose running times are essentially the same as that of
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT algorithm A breaking the Subspace assumption with nonnegligible advantage Adv
DS1
A (λ) (for some fixed positive integers K, N satisfying N ≥ 2K). We create a PPT algorithm B which breaks the DDH assumption in G 1 with non-negligible advantage Adv
for all j from 1 to N , where ψ is a random element of Z q . Then, B implicitly sets:
B also sets the dual basis as:
b
We observe that under these definitions, b j ·b * k ≡ 0 (mod q) when j ̸ = k, and b j ·b * j ≡ ψ (mod q) for all j from 1 to N . We note that B can produce all of g 
In other words, B has implicitly set µ 1 := µ ′ 1 + aµ ′ 2 and µ 2 := µ ′ 2 . We note that these values are uniformly random, and µ 2 is known to B. B can then form U 2 , . . . , U K as:
B implicitly sets τ 1 := b, τ 2 := c and computes:
, then these are distributed as
, hence violating the DDH assumption in G 1 .
The dual of the Subspace assumption in G 1 is Subspace assumption in G 2 (denoted as DS2), which is identical to Definition 11 with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. Similarly, we can prove that the Subspace assumption holds in G 2 if the DDH assumption in G 2 holds.
Generalized Decisional Subspace Assumption
We generalize the Decisional Subspace Assumption for Multiple Tuple of Dual Orthonormal Bases.
Definition 12 (GDS1: Generalized Decisional Subspace Assumption in G 1 ). Given a group generator G(·), define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}), 
The proof for above lemma is essentially the same as those of Lemma 2. The dual of the Generalized Subspace assumption in G 1 is Generalized Subspace assumption in G 2 (denoted as GDS2), which is identical to Definition 12 with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. Similarly, we can prove that the Generalized Subspace assumption holds in G 2 if the DDH assumption in G 2 holds.
Identity-Based Encryption
We first present our IBE construction along with our proof of its security under the SXDH assumption.
Construction. We begin with our IBE scheme:
-Setup(1 λ ) This algorithm takes in the security parameter λ and generates a bilinear pairing 
} , and the master key
} .
-KeyGen(PP, MK, id) This algorithm picks r ← r Z q . The secret key is computed as
-Enc(PP, id, m) This algorithm picks z ← r Z q and forms the ciphertext as
-Dec(PP, SK id , CT id ) This algorithm computes the message as m := C/e(C 0 , SK id ).
We note that applying Naor's transform [9, 11] to our scheme, we can also obtain an efficient signature scheme.
Correctness. Correctness is straight-forward:
Proof of Security. We prove the following theorem by showing a series of lemmas. 
where q n is the maximum number of A's key queries.
We adopt the dual system encryption methodology by Waters [37] to prove the security of our IBE scheme. We use the concepts of semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys in our proof and provide algorithms that generate them. We note that these algorithms are only provided for definitional purposes, and are not part of the IBE system. In particular, they do not need to be efficiently computable from the public parameters and the master key.
KeyGenSF The algorithm picks r, ν 1 , ν 2 ← r Z q and forms a semi-functional secret key as
EncryptSF The algorithm picks z, χ 1 , χ 2 ← r Z q and forms a semi-functional ciphertext as
We observe that if one applies the decryption procedure with a semi-functional key and a normal ciphertext, decryption will succeed because d * 3 , d * 4 are orthogonal to all of the vectors in exponent of C 0 , and hence have no effect on decryption. Similarly, decryption of a semi-functional ciphertext by a normal key will also succeed because d 3 , d 4 are orthogonal to all of the vectors in the exponent of the key. When both the ciphertext and key are semi-functional, the result of e(C 0 , SK v ) will have an additional term, namely
Decryption will then fail unless ν 1 χ 1 + ν 2 χ 2 ≡ 0 mod q. If this modular equation holds, we say that the key and ciphertext pair is nominally semi-functional. For a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A which makes q n key queries v 1 , . . . , v qn , our proof of security consists of the following sequence of games between A and a challenger B.
-Game Real : is the real security game.
-Game 0 : is the same as Game Real except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
-Game κ : for κ from 1 to q n , Game κ is the same as Game 0 except that the first κ keys are semifunctional and the remaining keys are normal.
-Game Final : is the same as Game qn , except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random identity in Z q . We denote the challenge ciphertext in Game Final as CT
We prove following lemmas to show the above games are indistinguishable by following an analogous strategy of [26, 28] . Our main arguments are computational indistinguishability (guaranteed by the Subspace assumptions, which are implied by the SXDH assumption) and statistical indistinguishability. The advantage gap between Game Real and Game 0 is bounded by the advantage of the Subspace assumption in G 1 . Additionally, we require a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext remains the same from the adversary's view. For κ from 1 to q n , the advantage gap between Game κ−1 and Game κ is bounded by the advantage of Subspace assumption in G 2 . Similarly, we require a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the the κ-th semi-functional key remains the same from the adversary's view. Finally, we statistically transform Game qn to Game Final in one step, i.e., we show the joint distributions of ( PP, CT
) and
are equivalent for the adversary's view. We let Adv Proof. B 0 is given
along with T 1 , T 2 . We require that B 0 decides whether T 1 , T 2 are distributed as
B 0 simulates Game Real or Game 0 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , T 2 . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B 0 first chooses a random invertible matrix A ∈ Z 2×2 q . We implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D, D * to:
We note that D, D * are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Moreover, B 0 cannot generate g
2 , but these will not be needed for creating normal keys. B 0 chooses random value α ∈ Z q and computes g α T := e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . It then gives A the public parameters
The master key 
where B 0 has implicitly set z := τ 1 . It gives the ciphertext (C, C 0 ) to A. Now, if T 1 , T 2 are equal to g ⊤ . Since A is random (everything else given to A has been distributed independently of A), these coefficients are uniformly random except with probability 2/q (namely, the cases τ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ 3 , χ 4 ) defined in Equation 3 is the zero vector ) from Lemma 1 Therefore, in this case, B 0 has properly simulated Game 0 . This allows B 0 to leverage A's advantage ϵ between Game Real and Game 0 to achieve an advantage ϵ − 
Proof. B κ is given
along with T 1 , T 2 . We require that B κ decides whether T 1 , T 2 are distributed as
B κ simulates Game κ or Game κ−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , T 2 . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B κ chooses a random invertible matrix A ∈ Z 2×2 q . We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D, D * to:
We note that D, D * are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. B κ chooses random value α ∈ Z q and compute g α T := e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . B can gives A the public parameters
The master key
} is known to B κ , which allows B κ to respond to all of A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm. Since B κ also knows g
2 , it can easily produce semi-functional keys. To answer the first κ − 1 key queries that A makes, B κ runs the semi-functional key generation algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A. To answer the κ-th key query for id κ , B κ responds with:
2 . This implicitly sets r := τ 1 . If T 1 , T 2 are equal to g
, then this is a properly distributed normal key. If T 1 , T 2 are equal to g
, then this is a semi-functional key, whose exponent vector includes
as its component in the span of b * 3 , b * 4 . To respond to the remaining key queries, B κ simply runs the normal key generation algorithm.
At some point, A sends B κ two pairs (m 0 , id * 0 ) and (m 1 , id * 1 ). B κ chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m β under id * β as follows:
where B κ has implicitly set z := µ 1 . The "semi-functional part" of the exponent vector here is:
We observe that if id * β = id κ (which is not allowed), then vectors 4 and 5 would be orthogonal, resulting in a nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair. It gives the ciphertext (C, C 0 ) to A.
We now argue that since id * 
. Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the κ-th key and the challenge ciphertext is independent of the random matrix A and id * β ̸ = id κ , we can conclude that these coefficients are uniformly except with probability 4/q (namely, the cases µ 2 or τ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ 1 , χ 2 ) or (ν 1 , ν 2 ) defined in Equations 3 and 2 is the zero vector) from Lemma 1. Thus, B κ has properly simulated Game κ in this case.
If T 1 , T 2 are equal to g
, then the coefficients of the vector 5 are uniformly except with probability 2/q (namely, the cases µ 2 = 1 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ 1 , χ 2 ) defined in Equations 3 is the zero vector) from Lemma 1. Thus, B κ has properly simulated Game κ in this case.
In summary, B κ has properly simulated either Game κ−1 or Game κ for A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , T 2 . It can therefore leverage A's advantage ϵ between these games to obtain an advantage ϵ − 6/q against the Subspace assumption in G 2 , namely Adv
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show the joint distributions of ( PP, CT
in Game qn and that of ( PP, CT
in Game Final are equivalent for the adversary's view, where CT
is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random vector in Z n q . For this purpose, we pick A := (ξ i,j ) ← r Z 2×2 q and define new dual orthonormal bases F := (f 1 , . . . , f 4 ), and
It is easy to verify that F and F * are also dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as D and D * . Then the public parameters, challenge ciphertext, and queried secret keys, (PP, CT } ,
. Then we can express them over bases F and F * as
} , ) expressed over bases F and F * is properly distributed as
In the adversary's view, both (D, D * ) and (F, F * ) are consistent with the same public parameters. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext and queried secret keys above can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Game qn over bases (D, D * ) and in Game Final over bases (F, F * ). Thus, Game qn and Game Final are statistically indistinguishable except with probability 1/q (namely, the case (χ 1 , χ 2 ) = 0). ⊓ ⊔
Lemma 7. For any adversary A, Adv
Proof. The value of β is independent from the adversary's view in Game Final . Hence, Adv
In Game Final , the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random identity in Z q , independent of the two messages and the challenge identities provided by A. Thus, our IBE scheme is weakly attribute-hiding (anonymous).
Inner Product Encryption
We now present our IPE scheme, the construction and security proof of which are essentially the same as our IBE except that we extend the embedded equality relation to general inner product relation.
Construction. We begin with our IPE scheme:
-Setup(1 λ ) This algorithm takes in the security parameter λ and generates a bilinear pairing := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) , m) WLOG, we assume that x 1 = 1. This algorithm picks z ← r Z q and forms the ciphertext as
-Dec(PP, SK v , CT x ) This algorithm computes the message as
Theorem 2. The IPE scheme is fully secure and weakly attribute-hiding under the SXDH assumption. More precisely, for any adversary
We adopt the dual system encryption methodology by Waters [37] to prove the security of our IPE scheme, the strategy is essentially the same as our IBE scheme. We first define semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys in our proof and provide algorithms that generate them.
KeyGenSF
The algorithm picks r, ν 1 , . . . , ν n ← r Z q and forms a semi-functional secret key as
EncryptSF The algorithm picks z, χ 1 , . . . , χ n ← r Z q and forms a semi-functional ciphertext as
We observe that if one applies the decryption procedure with a semi-functional key and a normal ciphertext, decryption will succeed because d * n+1 , . . . , d * 2n are orthogonal to all of the vectors in exponent of C 0 , and hence have no effect on decryption. Similarly, decryption of a semi-functional ciphertext by a normal key will also succeed because d n+1 , . . . , d 2n are orthogonal to all of the vectors in the exponent of the key. When both the ciphertext and key are semi-functional, the result of e(C 0 , SK v ) will have an additional term, namely e(g 1 , g 2 )
Decryption will then fail unless ν 1 χ 1 + . . . + ν n χ n ≡ 0 mod q. If this modular equation holds, we say that the key and ciphertext pair is nominally semi-functional. For a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A which makes q n key queries v 1 , . . . , v qn , our proof of security consists of the following sequence of games between A and a challenger B.
-Game Real : is the real security game. -Game 0 : is the same as Game Real except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. -Game κ : for κ from 1 to q n , Game κ is the same as Game 0 except that the first κ keys are semifunctional and the remaining keys are normal. -Game Final : is the same as Game qn , except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random vector in Z n q . We denote the challenge ciphertext in Game Final as CT (R)
denote an adversary A's advantage in the real game. 
Lemma 8. Suppose that there exists an adversary A where |Adv
2 , but these will not be needed for creating normal keys. B 0 chooses random value α ∈ Z q and computes e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . It then gives A the public parameters
is known to B 0 , which allows B 0 to respond to all of A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm.
A sends B 0 two pairs (m 0 , x * 0 ) and (m 1 , x * 1 ). B 0 chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m β under x * β := (x * 1,β , . . . , x * n,β ) as follows: 
Since A is random (everything else given to A has been distributed independently of A), these coefficients are uniformly random except with probability 2/q (namely, the cases τ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ 1 , . . . , χ n ) defined in Equation 7 is the zero vector) from Lemma 1 Therefore, in this case, B 0 has properly simulated Game 0 . This allows B 0 to leverage A's advantage ϵ between Game Real and Game 0 to achieve an advantage ϵ − 2 q against the Subspace assumption in G 1 , namely Adv
⊓ ⊔
Lemma 9. Suppose that there exists an adversary A where |Adv
Game κ−1 A (λ) − Adv Gameκ A (λ)| = ϵ.
Then there exists an algorithm B κ such that Adv

DS2
Bκ (λ) = ϵ − 6/q, with K = n and N = 2n.
Proof. B κ is given
along with T 1 , . . . , T n . We require that B κ decides whether T 1 , . . . , T n are distributed as
B κ simulates Game κ or Game κ−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , . . . , T n . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B κ chooses a random invertible matrix A ∈ Z n×n q . We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D, D * to:
We note that D, D * are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. B κ chooses random value α ∈ Z q and compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . B can gives A the public parameters
The master key MK := 2 , it can easily produce semi-functional keys. To answer the first κ−1 key queries that A makes, B κ runs the semi-functional key generation algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A. To answer the κ-th key query for v κ := (v 1 , . . . , v n ) , B κ responds with:
This implicitly sets r := τ 1 . If T 1 , . . . , T n are equal to g
, then this is a properly distributed normal key. If T 1 , . . . , T n are equal to g
, then this is a semifunctional key, whose exponent vector includes
as its component in the span of b * n+1 , . . . , b * 2n . To respond to the remaining key queries, B κ simply runs the normal key generation algorithm.
At some point, A sends B κ two pairs (m 0 , x * 0 ) and (m 1 , x * 1 ). B κ chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m β under x * β := (x * 1,β , . . . , x * n,β ) as follows:
We observe that if x * β · v κ = 0 (which is not allowed), then vectors 8 and 9 would be orthogonal, resulting in a nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair. It gives the ciphertext (C, C 0 ) to A.
We now argue that since 
Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the κ-th key and the challenge ciphertext is independent of the random matrix A and x * β · v κ ̸ = 0, we can conclude that these coefficients are uniformly except with probability 4/q (namely, the cases µ 2 or τ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ 1 , . . . , χ n ) or (ν 1 , . . . , ν n ) defined in Equations 7 and 6 is the zero vector) from Lemma 1. Thus, B κ has properly simulated Game κ in this case.
If T 1 , . . . , T n are equal to g
, then the coefficients of the vector 9 are uniformly except with probability 2/q (namely, the cases µ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, (χ 1 , . . . , χ n ) defined in Equation 7 is the zero vector) from Lemma 1. Thus, B κ has properly simulated Game κ in this case.
In summary, B κ has properly simulated either Game κ−1 or Game κ for A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , . . . , T n . It can therefore leverage A's advantage ϵ between these games to obtain an advantage ϵ − 6/q against the Subspace assumption in G 2 , namely Adv
Lemma 10. For any adversary A, Adv
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show the joint distributions of
v R is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random vector in Z n q . For this purpose, we pick A := (ξ i,j ) ← r Z n×n q and define new dual orthonormal bases F := (f 1 , . . . , f 2n ), and
It is easy to verify that F and F * are also dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as D and D * . Then the public parameters, challenge ciphertext for x * β := (x * 1,β , . . . , x * n,β ), and queried secret keys for {v ℓ : 
, which are all uniformly distributed if (χ 1 , . . . , χ n ) defined in Equation 7 is a non-zero vector since z,
are all uniformly picked from Z q . In other words, the coefficients s(
. . , f n , thus the challenge ciphertext can be viewed as a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random vector in Z n q . Moreover, all coefficients
) expressed over bases F and F * is properly distributed as
In the adversary's view, both (D, D * ) and (F, F * ) are consistent with the same public parameters. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext and queried secret keys above can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Game qn over bases (D, D * ) and in Game Final over bases (F, F * ). Thus, Game qn and Game Final are statistically indistinguishable except with probability 1/q (namely, the case (χ 1 , . . . , χ n ) = 0). ⊓ ⊔
Lemma 11. For any adversary A, Adv
In Game Final , the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random vector in Z n q , independent of the two messages and the challenge vectors provided by A. Thus, our IPE scheme is weakly attribute-hiding.
Key-Policy Functional Encryption
We now present our KP-FE scheme, the construction and security proof of which are analogues of the DLIN-based KP-FE scheme [32] . Analogously, We define functionρ 1 byρ 1 (j) := i ifρ(j) = (i, v j ) orρ(j) = ¬(i, v j ), whereρ is given in access structure A := (Â,ρ). As with [32] , we only deal with the case thatρ 1 is injective for A := (Â,ρ) with decryption key SK A in the proposed KP-FE scheme, see [32] for how to relax the restriction.
Correctness.
where
. EncryptSF A semi-functional ciphertext will take on one of two forms. The algorithms first run normal key generation algorithm to generate
A semi-functional key of type 1
and a semi-functional key of type 2
are formed as follows. It picks z 0 ← r Z q and computes For a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A which makes q n key queries A 1 , . . . , A qn , our proof of security consists of the following sequence of games between A and a challenger B.
-Game 0 : is the same as Game Real except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional of type 2.
-Game κ − : for κ from 1 to q n , Game κ is the same as Game 0 except that the first κ − 1 keys are semi-functional of type 2, the κ-th key is semi-functional of type 1, and the remaining keys are normal.
-Game κ : for κ from 1 to q n , Game κ is the same as Game 0 except that the first κ keys are semifunctional of type 2 and the remaining keys are normal.
-Game Final : is the same as Game qn , except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T . We denote the challenge ciphertext in Game Final as CT
We prove following lemmas to show the above games are indistinguishable by following an analogous strategy of [32] . Our main arguments are computational indistinguishability (guaranteed by the Subspace assumptions, which are implied by the SXDH assumption) and statistical indistinguishability. The advantage gap between Game Real and Game 0 is bounded by the advantage of the Subspace assumption in G 1 . Additionally, we require a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext remains the same from the adversary's view. For κ from 1 to q n , the advantage gap between Game κ−1 and Game κ − is bounded by the advantage of Subspace assumption in G 2 . Similarly, we require a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the the κ-th semi-functional key remains the same from the adversary's view. For κ from 1 to q n , the advantage gap between Game κ − and Game κ is bounded by the advantage of Subspace assumption in G 2 . Finally, we statistically transform Game qn to Game Final in one step, i.e., we show the joint distributions of ( PP, CT
are equivalent for the adversary's view. We let Adv
denote an adversary A's advantage in the real game.
Lemma 12. Suppose that there exists an adversary A where |Adv
Proof. B 0 is given
. We require that B 0 decides whether
.
B 0 simulates Game Real or Game 0 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1,0 , {T 1,i , . . . , T n i ,i } i∈ [d] . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B 0 implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D 0 , D * 0 to: 
We note that {D i , D * i } i∈ [0,d] are properly distributed, and reveal no information about
, but these will not be needed for creating normal keys. B 0 computes g T := e(g 1 , g 2 ) d 1,0 ·d * 1,0 and then gives A the public parameters
} is known to B 0 , which allows B 0 to respond to all of A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm. A sends B 0 the challenge messages m 0 , m 1 and attribute set Γ * := {(i,
. B 0 chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m β under Γ * as follows:
where s ← r Z q , B 0 has implicitly set s 0 := τ 1 . It gives the ciphertext (Γ,
, {g
, then this is a properly distributed normal encryption of m β . In this case, B 0 has properly simulated Game Real .
in their exponents. The coefficients here in the basis
To compute the coefficients in the basis 
are random (everything else given to A has been distributed independently of {A i } i∈ [d] ), these coefficients are uniformly random except with probability (2 + d)/q (namely, the cases τ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero, ζ 0 or there exists i ∈ [d] such that (χ 1,i , . . . , χ n i ,i ) defined in Equations 17 and 19 is zero or the zero vector) from Lemma 1. Therefore, in this case, B 0 has properly simulated Game 0 . This allows B 0 to leverage A's advantage ϵ between Game Real and Game 0 to achieve an advantage ϵ against the Subspace assumption in G 1 , namely Adv
Lemma 13. Suppose that there exists an adversary A where |Adv
B κ − simulates Game κ − or Game κ−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1,0 , {T 1,i , . . . , T n i ,i } i∈ [d] . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B κ − implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D 0 , D * 0 to:
and implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D i , D * i to:
We note that {D i , D * i } i∈ [0,d] are properly distributed, and reveal no information about {A i } i∈ [d] . 
We note that if
, whose exponent vectors include
We take the coefficients of vectors 20 in terms of the bases b * 2,0 , {b
and translate them into coefficients in terms of the bases d * 2,0 , {d
. Using the change of basis matrix {A i }) i∈ [d] , we obtain the new coefficients (in vector form) as:
We will argue that this is a semi-functional key of type 1. To respond to the remaining key queries, B κ − simply runs the normal key generation algorithm. A sends B κ − the challenge messages m 0 , m 1 and attribute set Γ * := {(i, 
We take the coefficients of vectors 22 in terms of the bases b 2,0 , {b n i +1,i , . . . , b 2n i ,i } i∈ [d] and translate them into coefficients in terms of the bases d 2,0 , {d n i +1,i , . . . , d 2n i ,i } i∈ [d] . Using the change of basis matrix {A i }) i∈ [d] , we obtain the new coefficients (in vector form) as:
If T 1,0 , {T 1,i , . . . , T n i ,i } i∈ [d] are equal to is uniformly and independently distributed on Z n i q .
We then observe the joint distribution (or relation) of 21 and 23. Those in cases 3-5 are obviously independent from τ 2 θ ′ 0 . Due to the restriction of adversary A's key queries, A κ does not accept Γ * . Therefore, τ 2 θ ′ 0 := τ 2 · 1 · ω ′ is independent from the joint distribution of τ 2 (θ ′ 1 , . . . , θ ′ a ) := τ 2Â · ω ′ (over the random selection of ω ′ ). Thus, τ 2 θ ′ 0 is uniformly and independently distributed from the other variables in the joint distribution of B κ − 's simulation except with probability 1/q (namely, the case τ 2 defined in Subspace problem is zero) from Lemma 1.
In summary, B κ − has properly simulated either Game κ−1 or Game κ − for A, depending on the distribution of T 1,0 , {T 1,i , . . . , T n i ,i } i∈ [d] . It can therefore leverage A's advantage ϵ between these games to obtain an advantage ϵ − (d + 3)/q against the Subspace assumption in G 2 , namely Adv [d] and N 0 = 3, {N i = 2n i } i∈ [d] . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented Subspace assumptions derived from the SXDH assumption. We also instantiate our framework to IBE, IPE, and KP-FE schemes. By shifting from the DLIN assumption to the simpler SXDH assumption, our schemes that are syntactically simpler and achieve shorter parameters.
